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In their study on ignorance-driven inference, Frosch, Beaman and McCloy (2007) reported a 
“less-is-more effect” (LiME) such that, when asked to judge the relative wealth of individuals, 
judgments were reliably more accurate when individuals did not recognise all of the names 
presented than when all the names were known. For example, participants might be more accurate 
when asked to compare the relative wealth of Mick Jagger and A.N. Unknown than when asked to 
compare the relative wealth of Mick Jagger and Keith Richards.   
This outcome arose from the prediction that participants apply a recognition heuristic (RH; 
Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002) that is, they use fame as a surrogate for wealth without accessing any 
further information about the recognised individual. A LiME occurs if wealth and fame are positively 
correlated and recognition is a more accurate predictor of wealth (when contrasting a known with 
an unknown individual) than knowledge (when contrasting two known individuals). The RH is 
applicable across a variety of relative judgments (e.g., the size of cities, the profitability of shares, 
the infectiousness of diseases, the success of sports teams) and is the first step in a class of simple 
heuristic decision-making strategies in which the minimum information necessary to provide a basis 
for judgment is searched or employed (Gigerenzer, Hertwig & Pachur, 2011).  
Frosch et al. (2007) concluded, in support of the RH, that “participants reliably use 
recognition as a basis for their judgments” (p. 1329) but, as an existence-proof, Beaman, Smith, 
Frosch and McCloy (2010) demonstrated how LiMEs might arise as a consequence of limited access 
to information about known items or individuals rather than choosing not to search for such 
information. Beaman et al. (2010) argued that many models with these properties would show 
similar behaviour but were unable to present empirical data to support this conjecture.  Relevant, 
but previously overlooked, data are however available in Frosch et al. (2007). Figure 1 shows the 
data from Frosch et al. (2007) for a comparison when participants were asked  “which of these two 
individuals is the richest?” presented in terms of the frequency of all choices rather than the 
percentage correct choices, and also breaks down the data into whether the choice was in 
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accordance with the RH. Viewing the data in this way reveals that the advantage for only recognising 
one of the individuals from the pair is apparent not only when participants’ choices are consistent 
with the RH but also when they seemingly disregard the RH and judge that the unrecognised 
individual is the wealthier of the two. Although this occurs only rarely (41 compared to 167 when the 
recognised individual was chosen) it is not predicted by the RH. This result was not obvious from the 
original analysis, which focussed on judgments in favour of the recognised option and the relative 
accuracy of judgments made when only one option was recognised. However a success rate which 
included these data-points where one option was recognised but the non-recognised option was 
chosen cannot ascribe all of this “ignorance-driven inference” advantage to RH usage. This is the first 
point to arise from this re-analysis. 
 
FIGURE ONE ABOUT HERE 
 
To determine the extent to which the RH is used, Hilbig, Erdfelder and Pohl (2010) 
introduced a measurement model, using multinomial processing tree techniques. The model 
consists of three decision trees which describe the possible decisions made given the recognition 
situations (recognise 0, 1 or 2 options) presented in Figure 1. The model is shown in Figure 2.  
 
FIGURE TWO ABOUT HERE 
 
Each branch of the tree is associated with a parameter which estimates the probability that 
branch is followed. The product of the parameters on a particular path gives the expected number of 
outcomes of that kind. So, if one option is recognised, the probability of using the RH is r, the 
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probability that the correct response is given is a. The probability that the RH is used successfully is 
therefore r a. Parameters are estimated given known constraints such as the total number of times 
exactly one item is recognised is known and the total number of times the correct response is given. 
The fact that a recognised option is chosen does not rule out the possibility that the RH is discarded 
and knowledge other than simple recognition is employed: Participants of a cautious nature might 
search for confirmatory evidence that Mick Jagger is sufficiently wealthy to choose over the 
unknown Fred Bloggs. A famous name for whom the information is available that s/he recently filed 
for bankruptcy might result in a deliberate choice against the RH. Applying Hilbig et al’s model  using 
multiTree software (Moshagen, 2010) the best-fitting set of parameters indicate that r, the 
estimated probability that the RH is employed is .571 The expected results of this model are shown 
in Figure 3 and these do not differ significantly from the observed data, G2 = 1.15, df = 1, p = .28. 
 
FIGURE THREE ABOUT HERE 
 
 These results do not invalidate Frosch et al’s (2007) observation of a less is more effect, but 
they indicate that the reasons behind this effect may differ from those assumed. Previously, it was 
concluded that the RH was employed approximately 80% of the time in the situation considered 
here and the less-is-more effect was taken both as a consequence of participants using this heuristic 
and as further evidence for the widespread application of the heuristic. However, if the model is 
rerun with r=.80 then the results differ significantly from the data, G2 = 22.49, df = 2, p = .00001. The 
current analysis suggests instead, the heuristic was employed only a little over half the time and the 
less-is-more effect  therefore cannot be ascribed wholly to the use of the heuristic (indeed, Figure 1 
                                                          
1 Other estimated parameter values are a (recognition validity) = .78, b (knowledge validity) = .58 and g 
(guessing validity) = .52. The fit is improved if g is not allowed to vary and set at a constant .5 (G2 = .1.43, df = 2, 
p = .49 but the other parameter values do not change and this version of the model is not significantly 
different from the original (G2 = .28, df = 1, p = .60) 
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implies a LiME for other strategies) and its appearance in any future data-set should not therefore 
be taken as unequivocal evidence that such a heuristic was universally employed.   
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FIGURE LEGENDS 
Figure 1.: Data redrawn from the two-alternative forced choice task of Frosch et al. (2007) when 
participants are asked “Which of these two individuals is the wealthiest?” The frequency of different 
choices is broken down by the number of options recognised (out of a maximum of two), whether 
the choice was consistent with the recognition heuristic (RH) when applicable, and whether the 
choice was correct. 
 
Figure 2: Graphical depiction of Hilbig et al.’s (2010) measurement model. The top decision tree 
represents the situation when neither of the options are recognised and g is the probability of a 
correct choice. The middle decision-tree represents the situation when only one option is 
recognised. In this situation, r is the probability of using the recognition heuristic (RH), a is the 
probability that the recognition heuristic gives the correct answer and b is the probability of a 
correct choice based upon knowledge. The bottom decision tree represents the situation when both 
options are recognised and b is once again the probability of a correct choice based upon 
knowledge. 
 
Figure 3.: The expected results for the best-fitting model applied to the data presented in Figure 1 
when all parameters are allowed to vary. The expected frequency of different choices is broken 
down by the number of options recognised (out of a maximum of two), whether the choice was 
consistent with the recognition heuristic (RH) when applicable, and whether the choice was correct. 
 
  
 A Little More Learning     8 
 
FIGURE ONE 
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FIGURE TWO 
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FIGURE THREE 
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